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RECENT DECISIONS
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-PREGNANCY-
FEDERAL UNEMPLOYMENT TAX ACT 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304(a)(12)-The United States Supreme Court has
held that § 3304(a)(12) of Federal Unemployment
Tax Act which mandates that no person shall be
denied compensation under state law solely on basis
of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy only
prohibits state from singling out pregnancy for
unfavorable treatment; it does not mandate
preferential treatment for women who leave work
because of pregnancy and Missouri statute which
denies unemployment compensation to claimant who
has left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to his work or to his employer was
consistent with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
which provides that no state participating in federal
state unemployment compensation program shall
deny compensation solely on basis of pregnancy or
termination of pregnancy.
Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821
(1987).
On August 23, 1980, Linda Wimberly requested a leave of absence
from her employer, the J.C. Penney Company ("Company"), as a
result of her pregnancy.' Pursuant to its established policy, the
1. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821, 823
(1987). Wimberly had been employed by the J.C. Penney Company as a sales clerk/
cashier for approximately three years at a rate of pay of $3.50 per hour. On August
23, 1980, Wimberly was seven months pregnant. Brief for Respondents at 5,
Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987).
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employer granted a leave but made no guarantee of reinstatement. 2
On December 1, 1980, Wimberly notified the company of her inten-
tion to return to work, but was informed that there were no positions
available.3
On December 7, 1980, Wimberly filed a claim for unemployment
compensation benefits with the Missouri Division of Employment
Security for the period beginning December 1, 1980. 4 A deputy for
the Division rejected Wimberly's claim based on the determination
that she had quit because of pregnancy,' and, therefore, pursuant to
section 288.050.1(1) of the Missouri Revised Statutes, 6 had voluntarily
terminated her employment without good cause attributable to her
work or to her employer. Wimberly appealed the decision of the
deputy to the division's appeals tribunal, which, after a full eviden-
tiary hearing, affirmed the deputy's determination.7 The Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri denied Wimberly's pe-
tition for review, thereby adopting the findings and conclusions of
the appeals tribunal.
8
The Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri reversed, holding
that the Missouri statute could not be enforced as it was violative
of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12), 9 as
2. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 823. The employer's policy was that employees
who take voluntary leaves of absence would be rehired only if a position was
available when the employee was ready to return to work. Wimberly's child was
born on November 5, 1980. Brief for Respondents at 5-6.
3. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 823.
4. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n,
107 S. Ct. 821 (1987).
5. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 823. The determination of the Deputy for the
Division of Employment Security of Missouri is not officially reported. It is printed
at Pet. App. A51-A53. Brief for Petitioner at 2.
6. Mo. REv. STAT. § 288.050.1(1) (1978 & Supp. 1984). The statute provides
in pertinent part that a claimant shall be disqualified if the deputy finds "[tihat he
has left his work voluntarily without good cause attributable to his work or to his
employer." Id.
7. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 823. At the hearing, Mrs. Wimberly asserted
that pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) and Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946
(D.S.C. 1980), aff'd as modified, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1150 (1983), a state is prohibited from denying unemployment compensation
benefits to women who have left their jobs due to pregnancy and are denied
reinstatement in those jobs when they are able to return to work. Brief for Petitioner
at 4.
8. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 823.
9. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982) provides that the Secretary of Labor shall
approve any state law submitted to him if he finds that the state law provides that
"[n]o person shall be denied compensation under such State law solely on the basis
of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy." Id.
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construed by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Brown v.
Porcher.10 On appeal by the Division of Employment Security and
the Labor and Industrial Relations Commission, the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Western District affirmed the circuit court deci-
sion." Although the court of appeals expressed skepticism regarding
the efficacy of the ruling in Brown,' 2 the court nevertheless deter-
mined that it was required to follow the Fourth Circuit's construction
of section 3304(a)(12).
3
In a 4-3 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding
that it would not disavow a substantial body of Missouri case law
construing section 288.050.1(1) to disqualify pregnant employees who
voluntarily leave work for reasons not attributable to the work or
to the employer on the basis of the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of section 3304(a)(12). 4 Rejecting the notion that it was bound by
Brown, the court reasoned that the plain language and legislative
history of section 3304(a)(12) only prohibits state laws from denying
compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy, and does not mandate
preferential treatment for pregnant women.'
5
On April 21, 1986, the United States Supreme Court granted
Wimberly's petition for a writ of certiorari. 6 In an opinion by Justice
O'Connor expressing the unanimous view of the eight participating
10. Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1150 (1983). The principal issue in Brown was whether 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12)
prohibited the South Carolina Employment Security Commission from denying
unemployment compensation benefits to women who were available and able to
work, solely because they left their jobs due to pregnancy. Id. at 1003. The Fourth
Circuit held that the Commission's practice of construing a South Carolina statute
as disqualifying any claimant who voluntarily left her most recent employment
because of pregnancy was violative of § 3304(a)(12). Id. at 1005.
11. Brief for Petitioner at 5. The decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Western District, was not officially reported. It is printed at Pet. App. A23-A40.
Id. at 2.
12. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 823.
13. Id. The Missouri Court of Appeals determined that Mo. Rav. STAT. §
288.050.1(1) must be interpreted and applied in conformity with the construction
applied to § 3304(a)(12) in Brown in all cases involving female employees who are
able to work and available for work but are denied unemployment compensation
benefits because they left their employment for reasons related to pregnancy. Brief
for Petitioner at 5.
14. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 350
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
15. Id. at 349.
16. Brief for Respondents at 9. Wimberly's Motion for Rehearing in the
Missouri Supreme Court was denied. Brief for Petitioner at 6.
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members of the Court, 17 the United States Supreme Court held that
26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) does not preclude a state from disqualifying
a claimant who voluntarily leaves her job because of pregnancy where
the state treats pregnant women like any other employee who vol-
untarily leaves work for a reason not causally connected to the work
or the employer."5 The Court further explained that the legislative
history and the federal Department of Labor's interpretation of
section 3304(a)(12) both affirm that the statute was not intended to
compel a state to afford preferential treatment for pregnant women,
but rather, was intended only to prohibit a state from singling out
pregnancy for discriminatory treatment. 9
The Supreme Court began its analysis by defining the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act 20 as a cooperative venture between the federal
government and the states to provide benefits to unemployed work-
ers. 2' Relying upon Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,22 the Court
established that, although the details of state unemployment com-
pensation programs are left to the discretion of the states themselves,
Congress has formulated certain fundamental federal standards with
which the states must comply in order to receive federal approval to
participate in the program.23 Section 3304(a)(12) is one such stan-
dard.14
While the comprehensive statutory scheme of each state varies in
its treatment of the distribution of unemployment compensation,
Justice O'Connor explained that all states require a claimant to have
earned sufficient wages over a prescribed period of time and to be
able to work and be available for work before that individual is
17. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 822. Justice Blackmun took no part in the
decision of the case. Id.
18. Id. at 828.
19. Id. at 825.
20. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982). The initial unemployment insurance
provisions were enacted under Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, Ch. 9,
Pub. L. No. 74-271, §§ 301-303, 49 Stat. 620, 626-27 (1935). The same provisions
were assimilated into the 1939 Internal Revenue Code as the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act, Ch. 23, §§ 3301-3308, 68A Stat. 439-54 (1954). This Federal Act is currently
part of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982). Brief for
Petitioner at 9 n. 6.
21. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct at 824.
22. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). In Steward, the Court pointed out that a state may
not "depart from those standards which in the judgment of Congress are to be
ranked as fundamental" if it is to participate in the federal-state program for
unemployment compensation. Id. at 594.
23. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824.
24. See supra note 9.
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entitled to receive benefits. 25 Claimants who fulfill these uniform
eligibility requirements may nevertheless be disqualified for some
particular state law reason. 26 At issue in this case is the Missouri
provision which disqualifies claimants who voluntarily leave their
jobs because of pregnancy.
27
As pointed out by Justice O'Connor, the treatment of pregnancy-
related terminations is a matter of considerable disagreement among
the states. While recognizing that most states, by judicial or admin-
istrative decision, regard pregnancy-motivated termination as a vol-
untary termination for good cause, 28 the Court noted that certain
states, like Missouri, have elected to define good cause narrowly.
29
In these states, all claimants who leave their jobs are denied unem-
ployment compensation benefits unless their reason for leaving is
causally connected to the work or to the employer.30 The Court
observed that under Missouri law, all persons who leave work for
reasons not attributable to their employer or connected with their
work are disqualified from receiving benefits.3"
Mindful of that fact, the Court then addressed the petitioner's
contention that section 3304(a)(12) is not only an anti-discrimination
statute, but that it also mandates preferential treatment for women
who leave work because of pregnancy.32 Concentrating on the express
language of section 3304(a)(12), the Court concluded that Congress'
25. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824. The Court described the following criteria:
first, all states determine whether a claimant earned a specified amount of wages
or worked a specified number of weeks in covered employment during a particular
base period; second, all states require claimants to be able to work and available
for work; and, third, if the claimant has earned sufficient wages over a particular
period of time and is able and available to work, the state may disqualify claimants
for reasons set forth in state law. Id.
26. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824.
27. Id.
28. Id. States with statutory provisions that specifically treat pregnancy as
good cause for leaving work include Arkansas, South Dakota, and Tennessee. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106(a) (1976 & Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 61-6-3
(1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-303(a)(1) (Supp. 1986). For arl example of a State
that has reached the same result by administrative determination, see CAL. ADMIN.
CODE, Tit. 22 § 1256-15(b), reprinted in 2 CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 5219 0
(Apr. 8, 1982). 107 S. Ct. at 824 n. 1.
29. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT., Tit. 40, §§ 2-404,
2-405 (1981);VT. STAT. ANN., Tit. 21, § 1344(a)(3) (1978 & Supp. 1986). 107 S. Ct.
at 824 n. 2.
30. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824.
31. Id. at 825.
32. Id.
1987]
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use of the qualifying phrase "solely on the basis of pregnancy," 33
indicated an attempt to proscribe only such state laws as created a
specific category for pregnancy-related claims, and then refused ben-
efits to those claimants.
34
Thus, the Court reasoned, according to Missouri law, the fact that
Mrs. Wimberly left because of pregnancy is irrelevant; all that is
significant is that she terminated her employment for a reason bearing
no causal connection to her work or to her employer.35 Because the
State's decision could have been made without ever knowing that
Wimberly had been pregnant, Justice O'Connor concluded that preg-
nancy was not the sole basis for the denial of benefits under a literal
reading of section 3304(a)(12).3
6
To support its judicial interpretation of the statute, the Court then
embarked upon a review of cases construing language similar to that
in section 3304(a)(12) as prohibiting disadvantageous treatment, rather
than mandating preferential treatment. Justice O'Connor cited Mon-
roe v. Standard Oil Co.,37 wherein the Court concluded that the
purpose of a provision of the Vietnam Era Veterans' Readjustment
Assistance Act of 197438 was to grant reservists the same advantages
afforded their co-workers without military obligations, but did not
mandate an employer's duty to bestow preferential treatment. 39 Con-
tinuing her analysis, Justice O'Connor cited Southeastern Community
College v. Davis,40 wherein the Court construed section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 197341 as intended to eliminate discrimination
against otherwise qualified individuals, but not to compel affirmative
efforts to counteract the disabilities caused by handicaps.4 2
Justice O'Connor next examined the legislative history of the
statute, dismissing the petitioner's claim that the deletion of language
which referred specifically to discrimination from the original version
33. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12).
34. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 825.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 452 U.S. 549 (1981).
38. 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(3) provides that a person shall not be denied retention
in employment because of any obligation as a member of the Nation's Reserve
Forces.
39. 452 U.S. at 562.
40. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973) provides that handicapped individuals who are
otherwise qualified shall not be excluded from a federally funded program solely
on the basis of their handicap.
42. 442 U.S. at 410.
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of section 3304(a)(12) manifested congressional intent to expand the
scope of the statute. 43 Instead, the Court interpreted the change in
the statutory language from that originally introduced to that finally
enacted as merely indicative of the intent of Congress to eliminate
excessive verbiage without altering the purpose of the statute."4
Justice O'Connor failed to find merit in Wimberly's reliance upon
House45 and Senate46 Reports dealing with disqualification provisions
pertaining to pregnancy, reiterating that the focus was on discrimi-
natory disqualifications solely because of pregnancy,47 and did not
preclude state provisions which neutrally disqualify workers who leave
their jobs for reasons unrelated to employment. 48 The Court then
cited Turner v. Department of Employment Security of Utah49 as
representative of the kind of statute that section 3304(a)(12) was
designed to prohibit. In Turner, the Supreme Court declared uncon-
stitutional a Utah unemployment compensation statute which imposed
a general disqualification of pregnant women during a twelve week
period before and a six week period after the expected date of
childbirth regardless of the reason for the claimant's separation from
her job.5 0
As final support for its holding, the Court noted the Department
of Labor's interpretation of section 3304(a)(12) as a provision not
43. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 826. The original version of § 3304(a)(12)
provided:
[N]o person shall be denied compensation under such State law solely on the
basis of pregnancy and determinations under any provision of such State law
relating to voluntary termination of employment, availability for work, active
search for work, or refusal to accept work shall not be made in a manner
which discriminates on the basis of pregnancy.
S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975); H.R. 8366, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. §
8(a) (1975) (emphasis added). 107 S. Ct. at 826.
44. Id.
45. H.R. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The House Ways and
Means Committee Report on the bill containing the language now found in §
3304(a)(12) names nineteen states that had special disqualification provisions per-
taining to pregnancy. Brief for Respondents at 34. Although the Report does not
specifically name those states, the parties agreed that Congress was probably referring
to the nineteen states listed in a letter issued by the Department of Labor a week
before the Committee Report was filed calling for the repeal of state laws which
included special disqualification provisions for pregnancy. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at
826. Neither Missouri not any state with a statute like Missouri's was included on
the list. See Unemployment Insurance Program Letter, No. 33-75 (Dec. 8, 1975).
46. S. Rep.No. 1265, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1975).
47. H.R. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1975).
48. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 827.
49. 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
50. Id.
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designed to treat pregnancy claimants more favorably, but only
requiring that they not be disqualified solely on the basis of pregnancy
or its termination5'
Thus, Justice O'Connor opined that Congress did not intend for
section 3304(a)(12) to create a special class of unemployment com-
pensation benefactors composed of women who have left their jobs
because of pregnancy, and who are not reinstated by their employ-
ers.12 In sum, the Court concluded that 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) does
not prohibit a state from disqualifying unemployment compensation
claimants who leave their jobs because of pregnancy when the state
imposes the same disqualification on all claimants who leave their
jobs for a reason not causally connected to their work or their
employer. 3 Accordingly, the Commission's interpretation of the Mis-
souri statute as disqualifying any claimant who leaves because of
pregnancy was found to be in accordance with the minimum federal
standard set forth in section 3304(a)(12)
54
The original Federal Unemployment Tax Act, (FUTA), was adopted
in 193515 in the aftermath of the great Depression. The purpose of
the Act was to encourage the states to enact unemployment compen-
sation programs to "protect workers and their families from the
economic ravages of unemployment. ' 5 6 It was also envisioned that
compensation benefits would stabilize the economy in times of re-
cession by preserving workers' purchasing power while they sought
alternative employment.
7
The current unemployment compensation system operates as a
cooperative effort between the federal government and the various
states. While FUTA imposes a federal payroll tax on wages paid by
covered employers,58 the Act also authorizes a credit59 against a
51. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 827-28.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 828.
54. Id.
55. Brief for Petitioner at 9. See supra note 20.
56. Brief for Petitioner at 9. The objective was to furnish an incentive for
the states to provide benefits to a newly unemployed worker "at a time when
otherwise he would have nothing to spend." Economic Security Act: Hearings on
S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 99, 119 (1935)
(statement of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), quoted in California Dept. of
Human Resources v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 131 (1971).
57. See Economic Security Act: Hearings on H.R. 4210 Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 172, 182 (1935) (statement of
Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor), quoted in Java, 402 U.S. at 132-33.
58. FUTA assesses an excise tax on employers in an amount equal to a
[Vol. 26:485
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substantial part of that federal tax liability to employers60 who
contribute to a state unemployment compensation fund6' certified by
the Secretary of Labor. 62 Federal grants to defray the cost of admin-
istering the system are awarded to federally-approved state pro-
grams .63
In order to obtain approval by the Secretary of Labor and to
receive the corresponding federal assistance and tax benefits, the
states must comply with certain fundamental federal standards. 64 In
theory, states are not compelled by FUTA to implement unemploy-
percentage of wages paid. 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (1982). The term "wages" is defined
as the cash value of all remuneration for employment, subject to a qualified list of
exclusions. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b) (1982).
59. Employers are given credit of up to 900o of the federal tax for contri-
butions to state plans that have been certified by the Secretary of Labor. 26 U.S.C.
§ 3302(a)(3) (1982).
60. 26 U.S.C. § 3302 (1982). The term employer means with respect to .any
calendar year, any person who (A) during any calendar quarter in the calendar year
or the preceding calendar year paid wages of $1,500 or more, or (B) on each of
some 20 days during the calendar year or during the preceding calendar year, each
day being in a different calendar week, employed at least one individual in employ-
ment for some portion of the day. For purposes of this paragraph, there shall not
be taken into account any wages paid to, or employment of, an employee performing
domestic services referred to in paragraph (3). 26 U.S.C. § 3306(a)(1) (1982).
61. In actuality, nine-tenths of the tax paid by employers goes into a state
fund for the payment of benefits for unemployed workers, and one-tenth goes to
the federal government for state and federal administrative expenses. Brief for
Respondents at 19.
62. Each year on October 31 the Secretary of Labor reports to the Secretary
of the Treasury each state whose law has been previously certified that continues
to comply with FUTA. States that are determined to be in violation of FUTA are
afforded an opportunity for a hearing. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(c) (1982).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1982). The release of federal funds to state governments
found to be in compliance with federal standards is authorized by the Social Security
Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504, 1101-1108 (1982). These grants are designed to compen-
sate for the necessary expense of administering the state's compensation program.
42 U.S.C. § 1101(c)(1)(B) (1982).
64. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) enumerates 18 requirements for approval of a state
plan. Brief for Respondents at 21. These standards are deemed fundamental because
Congress has stated that federal aid is available only to those states which conform
to these federal requirements. See Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
594 (1937); California Dept. of Human Resources Dev. v. Java, 402 U.S. 121, 125
(1971). Some of the § 3304(a) requirements focus on administration of state pro-
grams. For example, § 3304(a)(1) requires that unemployment compensation benefits
be paid through public employment agencies or other agencies that have been
previously approved by the Secretary of Labor. Other standards concern actions
that must be taken by the claimant. For example, § 3304(a)(7) states that "an
individual who has received compensation during his benefit year is required to have
worked since the beginning of each year in order to qualify for compensation in
his next benefit year."
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ment compensation programs, and to that extent, compliance with
the standards is voluntary. However, the lure of tax credits and
grants in return for conforming legislation has, in practice, induced
unanimous participation by the states.
65
With the exception of the minimum standards reflected in section
3304(a)(12), the execution of unemployment compensation is regarded
as a virtually exclusive province of the state. 66 Generally, all states
require a claimant to satisfy some form of a three-tier test.67 First,
the claimant must "earn a specified amount of wages or . . . work"
for a statutorily defined length of time in order to be eligible to
receive benefits. 68 Second, the unemployed worker must be both able
to work and available for work. 69 Third, the worker must not be
subject to disqualification prescribed by state law. 70
One of the most common reasons for statutory disqualification is
for voluntarily leaving the job without good cause. 71 The theory
behind such a provision is that unemployment compensation benefits
should be paid to only those claimants who are committed to working
and who are unemployed through no fault of their own. 72 Two basic
types of statutory standards are utilized to withhold benefits from
65. All 50 states and the District of Columbia are at present certified by the
Secretary of Labor. See Saint Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
451 U.S. 772, 775 n. 3 (1981); Cabais v. Egger, 690 F.2d 234, 236 n. 1 (D.C. Cir.
.1982).
66. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824.
67. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 18, Porcher v. Brown,
459 U.S. 1150 (1983) (denial of certiorari).
68. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824. This requirement is designed to evaluate
the claimant's attachment to the labor market. W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEM-
PLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY, 113-19 (1966) (describing general
requirements for unemployment compensation.) The object is to insure some con-
nection between the source of unemployment funds and their disbursement. Absent
this requirement, compensation funds might be depleted by persons who work
intermittently at the expense of the permanently employed. See R. ALTMAN, AvAIL-
ABILITY FOR WORK 75 (1950).
69. See R. ALTMAN, supra note 68, at 84; W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra
note 68, at 264-65.
70. The primary function of unemployment compensation is to compensate
individuals who are involuntarily unemployed. See Economic Security Act: Hearings
on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 1328 (1935).
Claimants whose unemployment results from their own actions are generally dis-
qualified. W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 68, at 114.
71. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible Women
on the Basis of Pregnancy: Section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1925, 1929 (1984).
72. Rosettenstein, Unemployment Benefits and Family Policy in the United
States, 20 FAm. LAW. Q. 393, 396 (1986).
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an employee who is considered to be voluntarily unemployed. 71 Either
(1) the employee must not have quit the job without good cause
connected with the employment, or (2) the employee simply must
not have quit the job without good cause.
74
According to the first formula, benefits will be awarded only if
the employee's leaving is directly attributable to the employer or the
job. This approach is closely bound to the values and demands of
the marketplace, but virtually eliminates subjective concerns, and in
particular, the family-related concerns of the individual employee as
'good cause' reasons for terminating employment. The second for-
mula leaves the determination of what constitutes good cause for
leaving employment, and whether only such cause attributable to the
employer or the job will be recognized, as a matter ultimately to be
decided on the basis of precedents established by state courts review-
ing decisions of the states benefit-granting authority.75 Most states
employ the second formula and regard pregnancy-motivated termi-
nation as good cause for leaving a job.7 6 The Missouri scheme,
however, adopts the first formula and narrowly defines good cause
for leaving work as only those reasons directly attributable to the
work or to the employer.
7 7
In 1976, Congress adopted a series of major amendments to
FUTA,78 adding, inter alia, a new federal minimum standard provid-
ing that "no person shall be denied compensation under such State
law solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.
' 79
Following the enactment of section 3304(a)(12), states that denied
benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy were ineligible to receive
federal unemployment funds.8 0 The ambiguity manifested by the
73. Id.
74. Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55
YALE L. J. 147, 150 (1945).
75. Id. See also Simrell, Employment Fault v. General Welfare as the Basis
of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 181 (1945).
76. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1106(a) (1976 and Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 61-6-3 (1978): TENN CODE ANN. § 50-7 303(a)(1) (Supp. 1986). For
an example of a state that has reached the same result by administrative determi-
nation, see CAL. AornN. CODE, Tit. 22 § 1256-15(b), reprinted in 2 CCH UNEMPL.
INS. REP. 5219 0 (Apr. 8, 1982). Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 824 n. 1.
77. Mo. REv. STAT. § 288.050.1(1) (1978 & Supp. 1984).
78. Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
566, 90 Stat. 2667 (1976).
79. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12).(1982).
80. 26 U.S.C. § 3304 (1982). The release of federal funds to states that comply
with federal standards is authorized by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-
504, 1101-1108 (1982).
1987]
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language "solely on the basis of pregnancy," and the relation of the
enactment to the Turner decision, however, has provoked two diver-
gent interpretations of section 3304(a)(12).' One view espouses that
the provision prevents the states from denying benefits to an otherwise
eligible individual solely because she left her last employment as a
result of pregnancy. 2 A contrary interpretation is that section
3304(a)(12) simply prohibits singling out pregnancy for unfavorable
treatment, but does not proscribe statutes that treat pregnancy like
all other medical conditions not connected with the employment.3
At the time the bills which ultimately became the 1976 amendments
to FUTA were introduced, several pregnancy-related employment
claims were pending in the federal courts.84 Of particular significance
is Turner v. Department of Employment Security.
85
In Turner, the Utah Supreme Court sanctioned a state regulation
which conclusively presumed pregnant women to be unable to work
and unavailable for work, and therefore ineligible for unemployment
compensation, for twelve weeks before and six weeks after child-
birth.16 One month after the introduction of the 1976 amendments,
8 7
the United States Supreme Court adjudged the Utah statute uncon-
stitutional on the ground that the conclusive presumption of inca-
pacity violated the substantive due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment.88
81. Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1150 (1983).
82. Id.
83. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 821.
84. See, e.g., Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and Power,
553 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1976), vacated and remanded, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (pension
plan contributions); Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd
in part, vacated in part and remanded, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (maternity leave and
seniority accumulation); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975),
rev'd, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (exclusion of pregnancy from employer disability insurance
plans) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982)).
85. 531 P.2d 870 (Utah), vacated and remanded per curiam, 423 U.S. 44
(1975).
86. 531 P.2d at 871. The relevant Utah statute is UTH CODE ANN. § 35-4-
5 (1953).
87. H.R. 10210 was introduced in October 1975. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975). The Turner decision was rendered in November 1975.
88. 423 U.S. 44 (1975). The plaintiff in Turner had already been receiving
unemployment compensation benefits because she had been involuntarily separated
from her job for reasons unrelated to her pregnancy. However, twelve weeks before
the expected date of childbirth, her compensation was terminated pursuant to the
Utah statute. The United States Supreme Court held that the conclusive presumption
of incapacity was constitutionally invalid. Brief for Respondents at 31-32.
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The timing of these two events is important because it is plausible
that the members of Congress were aware of the pendency of Turner,
and introduced section 3304(a)(12) to address legislatively the prob-
lems raised in that case. It is also possible that Congress had more
than this narrow purpose in mind, and purposefully enacted section
3304(a)(12) to eliminate all pregnancy-related inequities in the un-
employment compensation system by mandating preferential treat-
ment for pregnant women.8 9
Those who propose that Congress meant to ban only state laws
that single out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment contend that
section 3304(a)(12) was a response to the Turner case and merely
codified the Turner result in striking down statutes with presumptive
disqualifications on the basis of pregnancy alone. 9° The Wimberly
Court indorsed such an interpretation, 9' and acknowledged the Turner
rule as representative of the kind of discriminatory disqualification
provision that section 3304(a)(12) was intended to prohibit. 92 In
support of its narrow reading of section 3304(a)(12), the Wimberly
Court noted that the Senate Finance Committee Report on the 1976
amendments, 93 presented several months after the United States Su-
preme Court decision in Turner, specifically articulated the Turner
provision 94 as illustrative of the type of statute that would violate
the federal standard set forth in section 3304(a)(12).
89. Brief for Petitioner at 20.
90. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1941.
91. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 827.
92. Id.
93. S. REP. NO. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5997. The Committee's report is dated September 20,
1976. Id.
94. The report reads:
D. Provisions Related to Benefit Eligibility
Disqualification for Pregnancy
(Sec. 302 of the Bill)
In order to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, a worker must
be able to work, be seeking employment, and be available for employment. In a
number of states, an individual whose unemployment is related to pregnancy is
barred from receiving any unemployment benfits. In 1975 the Supreme Court found
a provision of this type in the Utah unemployment compensation statute to be
unconstitutional. The Utah requirement had disqualified workers for a period of 18
weeks (12 weeks before birth through 6 weeks after birth). The Court stated that
"a conclusive presumption of incapacity is constitutionally invalid." A number of
other states have similar provisions although most appear to involve somewhat
shorter periods of disqualification.
The committee bill includes, without modification, the provision of the House
bill which would prohibit states from continuing to enforce any provision which
1987]
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The Supreme Court's reasoning in this regard is flawed since it
would appear unlikely that section 3304(a)(12) could have been a
codification of a decision which had not yet been rendered at the
time the amendment was introduced. Furthermore, since it should
not be presumed that Congress would adopt useless and unnecessary
legislation,95 codification of a law limited to prohibiting statutes with
presumptive disqualification provisions exactly like the one in Turner
would be redundant and inconceivable.
The meaning of section 3304(a)(12) was construed by the judiciary
for the first time in Brown v. Porcher.96 Brown was a class action
denouncing the South Carolina Employment Security Commission's
practice of denying unemployment compensation to women who left
their last employment as a result of pregnancy. 97 As in Missouri,
women who left their jobs because of pregnancy were deemed to
have quit voluntarily without good cause.98 Plaintiffs argued that this
policy violated section 3304(a)(12) because it denied benefits to women
who were otherwise eligible (able to work and available to work)
solely on the basis of their pregnancy. 99
Like the Commission in Wimberly, the South Carolina Employ-
ment Security Commission officials in Brown contended that the
denies unemployment compensation benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy (or
recency of pregnancy). Pregnant individuals would, however, continue to be required
to meet generally applicable criteria of availability for work and ability to work.
S. REP. NO. 1265, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19, 21, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5997, at 6013, 6015.
95. See Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 740 (10th Cir. 1977).
96. 502 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1980), modified and remanded, 660 F.2d 1001
(4th Cir. 1981) (remand only to consider relief as to named plaintiffs), cert denied.
459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
97. 502 F. Supp at 947, 952-53. Plaintiff Brown was employed by a county
hospital as a dietary aide. On the advice of her physician, Mrs. Brown ceased
working because of illness associated with her pregnancy. Subsequent to giving
birth, she requested reinstatement but was informed that there were no openings.
Plaintiff Johnson, a salesclerk, also terminated her employment because of preg-
nancy-related problems. Likewise, Mrs. Johnson was denied reinstatement after the
birth of her child. 502 F. Supp. at 948-49; Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Brown v.
Porcher, 660 F. 2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981), noted in Note, Denial of Unemployment
Benefits, supra note 71, at 1932.
98. The Supreme Court of South Carolina has defined "good cause" to
mean, in most cases, a reason connected with the claimant's employment. Sherbert
v. Verner, 240 S.C. 286, 299, 125 S.E.2d 737, 744 (1962), rev'd on other grounds,
374 U.S. 398 (1963); Stone Mfg. Co. v. South Carolina Employment Sec. Comm'n.,
219 S.C. 239, 249, 64 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1951).
'99. Brief for Appellees, supra note 97, at 10, noted in Note, Denial of
Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1933.
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state did not deny compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy
because it treated pregnancy like any other medical condition that
was not attributable to the employer or connected with the work. 1' °
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected this argument
and held that the South Carolina policy violated the federal statute.10
The Brown court emphasized that regardless of how the Commission
handles claimants with other disabilities, it cannot deny benefits
solely because of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.
0 2
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Brown case with Justice
White, joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist, dissenting. 03 Justice
White expressed doubts regarding the efficacy of the Brown court's
interpretation of section 3304(a)(12), maintaining that the Fourth
Circuit's holding directly conflicted with the Department of Labor's
construction of the provision.1° 4
At the time the Wimberly case was initiated, Brown was the only
reported case construing section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act. Consequently, the decision in Brown significantly
influenced the holdings rendered by the Circuit Court of Jackson
County, Missouri and the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western Dis-
trict. 105 The Missouri Supreme Court, however, declined to follow
Brown, and instead concluded that the Department of Labor's con-
struction of section 3304(a)(12) more closely paralleled the legislative
history and the plain meaning of the statute. 1°6 Recognizing that its
decision was in direct conflict with the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Missouri Supreme Court nevertheless maintained that
it would not disavow a long and substantial body of Missouri case
law in favor of the Fourth Circuit's questionable construction of a
federal statute. 0 7
100. Brief for Appellants at 10-14, Brown, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1981),
noted in Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1934.
101. 660 F.2d at 1005.
102. Id. at 1004.
103. Porcher v. Brown, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
104. Id. at 1151. Justice White believed that three important aspects of the
Porcher decision merited attention: (1) the disparate interpretations of § 3304(a)(12)
offered by the Secretary of Labor and the Fourth Circuit; (2) the applicability of
the eleventh amendment to the decision; and (3) the availability of the cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the state's failure to comply with §
3304(a)(12). 459 U.S. at 1151-54.
105. Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d 344, 347 (1985).
106. Id. at 349.
107. Id. at 350.
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When the United States Supreme Court granted Mrs. Wimberly's
petition for certiorari, it faced the difficult task of resolving the
disparate interpretations of section 3304(a)(12) which had created
substantial uncertainty in an area of great practical significance to
the states, the Department of Labor, and large numbers of pregnant
women. There are twenty-one million women'0 in this country be-
tween the ages of eighteen and thirty-four who actively participate
in the civilian labor force.1°9 Nearly eighty-five percent of these
women will give birth to at least one child during their working
lives. 10 Studies indicate that the number of women participating in
the work force is growing,"' and that women are not only making
a significant contribution to family income, 1 2 but often they are the
sole source of it.
'11
Because it is almost inevitable that a pregnant woman will tem-
porarily have to leave her job for childbirth,"14 the availability of
108. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1925, citing
U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS,
series P-20, No. 363, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 33
(1981).
109. The term "civilian labor force" encompasses all nonmilitary persons
classified as employed or unemployed. Persons who are neither employed nor seeking
work outside their own home, retired persons, students, seasonal workers for whom
the survey fell off season, those with long-term disabilities and the voluntarily
unemployed are excluded. U.S. BUREAU or THE CENSUS, U.S. BUREAU OF COMMERCE,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: CONSUMER INCOME, series P-60, No. 132, MONEY
INCOME OF HOUSEHOLD. FAmIms AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1980, at 225
(1982) cited in Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1925 n.
2.
110. This age range was selected as representative of the primary child-bearing
years. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-20, No. 325, FERTLITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE
1977 (1978).
111. During the 1970's women represented 6007o of the growth of the labor
force. The participation rate of women in the labor force rose from 43%70 in 1970
to 5107o in 1980. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 110, at 3.
112. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1953, citing
S. KAmERmAN, MATERNITY AND PARENTAL BENEFITS AND LEAVES 8 (Impact on Policy
Series Monograph No. 1, 1980) (summary of relevant statistics).
113. See S. KMvERMAN, supra note 112, at 8.
114. Policy Statement of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists (adopted Mar. 2, 1974), quoted in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500 n.
4 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The statement provides in relevant part that:
Pregnancy is a physiological process. All pregnant patients, however, have a
variable degree of disability on an individual basis, as indicated below, during
which time they are unable to perform their usual activities. (1) In an
uncomplicated pregnancy, disability occurs near the termination of the preg-
nancy, during labor, delivery and the puerperium. The process of labor and
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unemployment compensation for women like Mrs. Wimberly who
wish to return to work but are denied reinstatement is a crucial issue.
Minority and low-income women workers are particularly disadvan-
taged by a state policy that denies unemployment compensation to
women in Mrs. Wimberly's situation." 5 Not only are these women
less likely to receive guaranteed maternity leaves, but they are often
the sole supporters of their families." 6 Absent a guarantee of rein-
statement and without any assurance of compensation while seeking
alternative employment, many women may be forced to choose
between employment and childbirth.
The Wimberly Court's analysis of the statutory language, the
legislative history, and the Department of Labor's interpretation of
section 3304(a)(12), however, suggests that Congress did not intend
to enact a law which would allow the states to bestow a discriminatory
preference in favor of pregnant and formerly pregnant claimants for
unemployment compensation insurance. To rationalize this interpre-
tation, the Court focused on Congress' use of the qualifying phrase
''solely. 1117
puerperium is disabling in itself. The usual duration of such disability is
approximately six to eight weeks. (2) Complications of a pregnancy may occur
which give rise to other disability. Examples of such complication include
toxemia, infection, hemorrhage, ectopic pregnancy, and abortion. (3) A woman
with pre-existing disease which in itself is not disabling, may become disabled
with the addition of pregnancy. Certain patients with heart disease, diabetes,
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, renal disease, and other systemic condi-
tions may become disabled during their pregnancy because of the adverse
effect pregnancy has upon these conditions.
The onset, termination and cause of the disability, related to pregnancy,
can only be determined by a physician. Id.
115. Brief for Petitioner at 39-40.
116. First Friday Report, Joblessness Among Woman: A Portrait of Female
Unemployment, at 10 and 17, November 1, 1985, Coalition on Women and Em-
ployment and the Full Employment Action Council, Washington, D.C., cited in
Brief for Petitioner at 40.
In 1985, for example, 10.5 million single women maintained families compared
to 2.3 single men. Brief for Petitioner at 40 n. 22. Approximately 50 percent of all
Black families with children under 18 years of age were headed by single women in
1984, compared to 25 percent of Hispanic families and 15 percent of White families.
Id. Families that are supported by single women account for nearly half of all
families who are living in poverty. Id. In 1983, female-headed families comprised
47 percent of all poor families. Id. More than 68 percent of Black female-headed
families and 70 percent of Hispanic female-headed families with children under 18
years of age lived in poverty in 1983. Id.
117. See Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 825; see also Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d
at 1004.
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The word "solely," interpreted in its plain and ordinary sense,
means "to the exclusion of all else." '" 8 This literal definition unfor-
tunately does little to resolve the issue of whether Congress, in using
the word "solely", intended to prohibit all statutes that withhold
benefits based on pregnancy or only those provisions which single
out pregnancy for disadvantageous treatment." 9
In Wimberly, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute only
prohibits disqualification provisions where pregnancy is the sole basis
for the State's decision. 20 Justice O'Connor emphasized that the
focus of the word "solely" is not on the claimant's reason for leaving
her job.' 2 ' Accordingly, it was interpreted that Mrs. Wimberly was
not disqualified solely because she was pregnant, but rather because
her reason for leaving her most recent job was not related to that
job. The Court explained that a state may adopt a neutral rule which
incidentally disqualifies pregnant or formerly pregnant women as part
of a larger group of claimants disqualified for medical conditions
not connected with employment even though pregnancy may have
been the claimant's "sole" reason for leaving her job. 122
The concept of equating pregnancy with other illness-related se-
parations from employment originated in the context of several
pregnancy related unemployment discrimination claims brought in
the 1970's.123 Many of these challenges condemned mandatory ma-
ternity leave policies'24 or employer-sponsored disability insurance
plans that disqualified pregnancy. 125 Throughout these cases, employ-
ers consistently argued that pregnancy was not an illness, but rather
a voluntary assumed physical condition. 26 Most courts rejected this
118. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1097 (8th ed. 1980).
119. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1946.
120. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 825.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Some of these claims were grounded in Equal Protection theories brought
under the fourteenth amendment or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). See, e.g., LaFleur v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), aff'd., 414 U.S. 632 (1974)
(mandatory maternity leave); Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
rev'd. sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy
from state disability plan).
124. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Green
v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973).
125. See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975),
rev'd., 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (overruled by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982) (enacted
October 31, 1978).
126. See, e.g., Newman v. Delta Air Lines, 374 F. Supp. 238, 245 (N.D. Ga.
1973), aff'd. per curiam, 475 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1973); Gilbert v. General Elec.
Co., 519 F.2d at 665; Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 206 (3d Cir.
1975), vacated, 424 U.S. 737 (1976).
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theory on the ground that, although pregnancy is not an illness or
a disease, it similarly can result in the inability to work, an increase
in medical expenses, and the loss of income.
27
The federal government and Congress have also considered preg-
nancy and other medical conditions as analogous. Since 1972, for
example, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission guidelines il-
lustrate a parallelism between pregnancy and illness.1 28 More recently,
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978129 incorporated within its
provisions the correlation between illness and pregnancy. In the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Congress clearly expressed
the intent that women affected by pregnancy be treated in the same
manner as other persons not so affected by pregnancy, but similar
in their non-job-related physical disability to work. 30 Based on these
facts, it is alleged that preferential treatment of pregnant or formerly
pregnant employees was not contemplated by Congress when it
enacted section 3304(a)(12)."'
The legislative history of section 3304(a)(12) is scant,3 2 however,
and provides little insight as to whether Congress meant only to
eliminate pregnancy-related discrimination or whether Congress sought
127. See Note, Love's Labor Lost: New Conceptions of Maternity Leaves, 7
HARv. C.R.-C.L.L.REv. 260, 282 (1972) (listing similarities between childbirth and
short-term disabilities in general).
128. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1984), noted in Note, Denial of Unemployment
Benefits, supra note 71, at 1951 n. 148. The original 1972 version of the regulations
is printed in 37 Fed. Reg. 6835, 6837 (1972). This section reads:
§ 1604.10 Employment policies relating to pregnancy and childbirth.
(a) A written or unwritten employment policy or practice which excludes
from employment applicants or employees because of pregnancy is in prima
facie violation of Title VII.
(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abor-
tion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes,
temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or
temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with
employment. Written and unwritten employment policies and practices involv-
ing matters such as the commencement and duration of leave, the availability
of extensions, the accrual of seniority and other benefits and privileges,
reinstatement, and payment under any health or temporary disability insurance
or sick leave plan, formal or informal, shall be applied to disability due to
pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied
to other disabilities. Id.
129. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
130. Id. Title VII of the Act recommended that women affected by pregnancy
"be treated the same as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or
disability to work ... ." Id.
131. Brief for Respondents at 47.
132. Brown, 660 F.2d at 1004.
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to prohibit all pregnancy related disqualifications in the unemploy-
ment compensation system.133 The original draft of the amendment
proposed that the states be prohibited not only from denying com-
pensation solely on the basis of pregnancy, but also from determining
voluntary terminations of employment, availability for work, active
search for work, or refusal to accept work in a way which adversely
affects pregnant women. 13 4 That version was clearly an anti-discrim-
ination statute. 135 The provision that was eventually codified, how-
ever, retained only the portion prohibiting the denial of benefits
"solely on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.' ' 3 6
In Wimberly, the Missouri Supreme Court acknowledged that the
original language of the act would have expressly authorized the
holding in Brown, and would have required states like Missouri and
South Carolina to terminate their practice of disqualifying claimants
who left their jobs because of pregnancy. 3 7 The Court further
theorized, however, that Congress purposely chose to delete the broad
language in the second clause to avoid creating a sweeping ban like
that attributed to section 3304(a)(12) by Brown.'38
The United States Supreme Court offered a different explanation
for the deletion of language from the original draft. 13 9 Since the
legislative history contains no express explanation of why section
3304 (a)(12) was modified, 4° the Supreme Court interpreted Congress'
silence on the question as indicative that the change in statutory
language was simply an attempt to eliminate a superfluous and
redundant phrase without intending to alter the meaning of the
provision.' 4' Although Petitioner Wimberly maintained that the elim-
133. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1946.
134. The original draft of the 1975 bill provided that:
"No person shall be denied compensation solely on the basis of pregnancy
and determinations under any provision of such State law relating to voluntary
termination of employment, availability for work, active search for work, or
refusal to accept work shall not be made in a manner which discriminates on
the basis of pregnancy."
S. 2079, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(a) (1975); H.R. Rep. No. 8366, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8(a) (1975).
135. Brief for Petitioner at 19.
136. H.R. 10210 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 312 (1975), cited in H.R. Rep No. 755,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976).
137. Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 349.
138. Id.
139. Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 349.
140. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1942.
141. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 826.
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ination of language referring directly to discrimination manifested
congressional intent to transform the statute from a simple anti-
discrimination provision to a provision mandating preferential treat-
ment for pregnant women, 142 the United States Supreme Court dis-
agreed, maintaining that it was illogical to suggest that the deletion
of language could expand the scope of the statute.
14
1
The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the bill con-
taining the language now found in section 3304(a)(12) 14 referred to
nineteen states that had special disqualification provisions denying
benefits because of pregnancy. 145 Although the report did not specify
the nineteen states to which it referred, the Wimberly Court presumed
that Congress was referring to a Labor Department Unemployment
Insurance Program Letter' 46 issued one week before the Committee
Report was filed.
142. Brief for Petitioner at 20.
143. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 826.
144. H.R. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1975). The House report
accompanying the amendments listed the objectives of the bill:
The Unemployment Compensation Amendments Act of 1975 (H.R. 10201) is
designed to achieve the following objectives:
provide coverage under the permanent federal-state Unemployment Com-
pensation law for substantially all of the nation's wage and salary earners and
thereby eliminate the need for the temporary Special Unemployment Assistance
program;
restore solvency in the Unemployment Compensation program at the state
and federal levels by increasing revenues in a manner that distributes fairly
the impact of additional employer-paid taxes;
modify the "trigger mechanism" in the Extended Benefits program; and
establish a National Study Commission that will undertake a thorough
and comprehensive examination of the present Unemployment Compensation
program and make recommendations for further improvements.
H.R. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976), quoted in Note, Denial of
Unemployment Benefits, supra note 71, at 1931 n. 42.
145. The relevant portion of the House Report explains:
"At the present time, 19 states have provisions which, if in effect, deny
benefits because of pregnancy. They vary from state to state, but they are all
inequitable in that they deny benefits without regard to the woman's ability
to work, availability for work, or efforts to find work."
H.R. Rep. No. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1976).
146. "Summary of Discriminatory State Provisions Relating to Pregnancy,
Domestic and Marital Obligations and Dependents' Allowances", Unemployment
Insurance Program Letter No. 33-75 [1975-1979 Transfer Binder] UNEMPL. INs. REP.
(CCH) 21,482 at 3796 (May 4, 1976), noted in Brief for Petitioner at 23 n. 12.
The nineteen jurisdictions cited as having discriminatory pregnancy provisions were
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Indiana, Kansas,
Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia. Id.
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The statutory provisions of the nineteen states listed in the De-
partment of Labor's Unemployment Insurance Letter varied consid-
erably in their treatment of pregnancy. Some states imposed periods
of ineligibility after return to work 147 or after notifying employers of
a desire to return to work.148 Other states provided for presumptive
periods of disability or unavailability. 149 In some states, disability or
unavailability was presumed in the absence of contrary proof. 50
Neither Missouri nor South Carolina (the state involved in Brown)
was listed as a state having statutory disqualification provisions
relating to pregnancy. According to petitioner Wimberly, the reason
for this .omission is only because their discriminatory policies do not
appear on the face of the statutes, but are instead disguised through
the application of apparently neutral disqualification provisions.5
The Supreme Court insisted, however, that not only was Missouri's
statute neutral, but its practice of treating pregnancy the same as
medical conditions was also neutral in its disqualification of all
workers who leave their jobs for reasons unrelated to their employ-
ment. "
As final support for its position, the Supreme Court accorded
great weight to the view of the Department of Labor as the agency
Congress entrusted with administration of the statute.'53 A Depart-
147. For example, in Colorado a claimant was ineligible after childbirth until
she had been re-employed for 13 weeks. If she was the sole support of a child or
an invalid spouse, however, she was ineligible for only 30 days. In Tennessee, a
woman was disqualified for 21 days after she was able to work. In West Virginia,
the period of ineligibility ranged from 30 days after return to work to 6 weeks
before and after, depending on the circumstances of the separation. Unemployment
Insurance Program Letter, supra note 146.
148. In Alabama, women whose maternity leaves extended beyond ten weeks
were disqualified unless they gave their employers three weeks notice of a desire to
return to work. Id.
149. The District of Columbia, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey, Rhode Island,
Utah and Texas imposed varying periods of presumptive disability or unavailability.
Id. Provisions of this type are presumably unconstitutional after the Supreme Court
decision in Turner.
150. In Delaware, Oregon, Maryland, Nevada, and Ohio there was a pre-
sumption of disability until rebutted by a statement from the women's physician or
by a ruling by the program's administrator. Id.
151. Brief for Petitioner at 23-24.
152. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 827.
153. FUTA, however, does provide for judicial review in 26 U.S.C. § 3310
(1982). Section 3310(a) indicates that any state denied certification by the Secretary
may file for review in the United States Court of Appeals. Section 3310(c) authorizes
the court to set aside or affirm the Secretary's actions. 26 U.S.C. § 3310(a), (c)
(1982).
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ment of Labor Commentary issued shortly after the enactment of
section 3304(a)(12) emphasized that the federal statute requires only
that a pregnant claimant not be treated differently from any other
unemployed individual, and that benefits be determined not on the
basis of pregnancy, but on the basis of whether the pregnant claimant
meets the statute's conditions for receipt of benefits.' T The agency
reiterated its position in a subsequent communication to the states,
indicating that section 3304(a)(12) does not mandate preferential
treatment of pregnancy claimants, but only requires that they not be
disqualified solely because of pregnancy or its termination.' Finally,
in his Memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae in
Wimberly, the Solicitor General repeated that the agency still adheres
to the view that section 3304(a)(12) does not prohibit state plans like
that of Missouri which group pregnancy with other medical condi-
tions.
15 6
Although Congress has traditionally recognized society's interest in
preserving the unique and important rights of procreation and family
life,'57 the Wimberly Court refused to recognize that Congress in-
tended to mandate a discriminatory program as it relates to preg-
nancy. At the core of the issue is the underlying perception that,
while the economic impact on pregnant and formerly pregnant claim-
ants for unemployment compensation insurance is adverse, it is not
a consequence which the marketplace ought to be obligated to insure
against. In essence, the pregnant employee is regarded as subordi-
nating the interests of the labor force to the individual interests of
the family.
It is not clear that the unemployment compensation system ought
to be structured in this manner. Indeed, the general goal of FUTA
to help to stabilize the economy and to provide income maintenance
protection for the nation's workers would suggest the contrary.
154. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment, and Training Administration Un-
employment Insurance Service, Draft Language Commentary to Implement the
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1976 - Public Law 94-566 at 62,
noted in Brief for Respondents at 42 n. 30.
155. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Employment, and Training Administration Un-
employment Insurance Service, Supplement No. I Questions and Answers Supple-
menting Draft Language and Commentary to Implement the Unemployment
Compensation Amendments of 1976 Pub. Law No. 94-566, at 26, noted in Brief
for Petitioner at 47 n. 35.
156. Brief for the United States as amicus curiae at 12-13, Wimberly, 107 S.
Ct. 821.
157. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (mandatory sterilization).
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Ostensibly, the majority of states have recognized the economic
disadvantages faced by working women who are denied unemploy-
ment compensation benefits for pregnancy-related separations. Few
jurisdictions currently deny benefits to pregnant or formerly pregnant
claimants under illness-related disqualification provisions requiring
that termination be for good cause attributable to the employer.'58
Even those jurisdictions which do not require that the reason for
leaving be attributable to the employer are apparently. relaxing their
evaluation of what constitutes "good cause" in favor of pregnancy
related concerns. 159 The Wimberly Court, however, has failed to
recognize that this trend represents states in the vanguard of some
general movement to accommodate the changing needs of pregnant
women within the framework of the unemployment compensation
system. On the contrary, the Wimberly decision will inevitably have
an adverse impact on all pregnant and formerly pregnant women
who want to work and are able to work, but who are disqualified
because they separated from work for a reason not attributable to
the work place or to the employer.
The Wimberly decision has done little to accommodate a re-
evaluation of the role of the family in society as a whole by a
recognition of the changing role of women in the work force. The
present situation in the United States seems to be that, in the absence
of a consistent national policy, jurisdictions are free to formulate
their own decisions as to whether family-related concerns should
justify a good cause reason for leaving the job.
Although it is important to recognize Congress' interest in pre-
serving state responsibility for unemployment compensation, it is
equally important to note that Congress imposed limitations on the
powers of the states by imposing a series of fundamental standards
with which states desirous of federal funds must comply. When these
guidelines are applicable, states are not free to create any form of
158. The Solicitor General, in his brief as amicus curiae in Porcher v. Brown,
noted that eight states and the District of Columbia denied benefits to claimants
who left work because of health problems unrelated to their employment: Louisiana,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, West Virginia and,
to a lesser extent, Vermont. Since the brief was filed, however, New Mexico has
amended its statute to prohibit the denial of benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy.
N. M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-7(A) (1983 Rep. Vol.). Thus, although New Mexico still
disqualifies claimants who leave work for causes unrelated to employment, pregnancy
is exempt from this disqualification. Note, Denial of Unemployment Benefits, supra
note 71, at 1926 n. 10.
159. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 26:485
RECENT DECISION
compensation program they desire without jeopardizing their claim
for federal funds. 160
Although Wimberly presented the Court with an appropriate ve-
hicle through which to settle the controversy surrounding pregnancy-
related disqualifications in the unemployment compensation arena,
the Court offered nothing more than a superficial analysis of statu-
tory interpretation focused on justifying its ultimate deference to the
Department of Labor's interpretation of section 3304(a)(12). In this
regard, the decision in Wimberly is a disappointment, especially since
the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that reviewing courts are
not required to follow agency decisions that are clearly inconsistent
with legislative intent or policy.' 6' In light of the ambiguous language
of the statute and the equivocal legislative history of the amendment,
the cost of the Court's deference to the Labor Department was
considerable because it overlooked the remedial purpose of FUTA,
Congress' substantial interest in protecting the nation's workers, and
the evolving trend of the majority of state legislatures to interpret
section 3304(a)(12) as mandating abolition of all pregnancy-related
disqualifications.
Given the importance of the labor force and the unemployment
compensation system on the one hand, and the significance of the
family on the other, it would seem appropriate to implement a
consistent nationwide policy to finally address these issues. Thus,
while it seems that the eradication of all pregnancy-related disquali-
fications would be a desirable step in promoting the economic security
of families, the Supreme Court's failure to do so in Wimberly
indicates that the issue is obviously one which must be appropriately
remedied by Congress and not the judicial system.
Patricia Kurp Masten
160. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 593-94 (1937).
161. See Espinosa v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973) ("The Com-
mission's more recent interpretation of the statute ... is no doubt entitled to great
deference, but that deference must have limits where, as here, application of the
guideline would be inconsistent with an obvious congressional intent ... .") (citation
omitted); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261, 272 (1968)
("But the courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction ..
and 'are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of adminis-
trative decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate
the congressional policy underlying a statute.' ") (quoting NLRB v. Brown, 380
U.S. 278, 291 (1965)).
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